ویرگول
ورودثبت نام
مهندسی صنایع ایران
مهندسی صنایع ایرانمهندسی صنایع ایران، عماد مهندسی کشور: [email protected]
مهندسی صنایع ایران
مهندسی صنایع ایران
خواندن ۳ دقیقه·۲۵ روز پیش

تحلیل رقابت کشتیرانی و سیاست های کاهش آلودگی

دکتر افشین منصوری، استاد مدیریت عملیات و زنجیره تامین دانشگاه برونل لندن روز دوشنبه 4 آبان از طریق دانشگاه علم و صنعت ایران به تحلیل رقابت بین خطوط کشتیرانی و بررسی مداخلات سیاستی برای کاهش آلودگی ناشی از فعالیت های حمل و نقل دریایی پرداخت.

Analyzing Liner Competition and Policy Interventions to Mitigate Excess Emissions in Maritime Shipping

Afshin Mansouri
Brunel University of London

Liner shipping companies operate within a high-pressure global logistics network where strict scheduling is paramount. A major driver of environmental inefficiency in this sector is the competition for limited port berthing slots, typically allocated via a First-Come, First-Served (FCFS) discipline.

This triggers a destructive “race to the port,” as vessels stray from economical slow-steaming speeds to secure earlier access, leading to significant fuel waste and emissions. While traditional maritime research often focuses on bunker management and route optimization, this study provides a comprehensive analysis of vessel competition as a primary source of environmental externalities.

We argue that port competition counteracts the environmental benefits of slow-steaming, creating a systemic inefficiency that hampers the industry’s progress toward global net-zero targets.

To rigorously analyze this phenomenon, we formulate vessel competition for port priority as a War of Attrition (WoA). This evolutionary game framework, used to model biological conflicts, is ideal for maritime operations where the “cost of fighting” is the fuel consumption penalty of speeding and the “prize” is reduced port waiting time.

We address the complexity of these interactions across two modelling layers:

Symmetric Contests (Budget-Constrained Game): For vessels with similar specifications, we model the competition as a budget-constrained game. Following the logic of noisy players in competitive contests, we distinguish between high-intensity races—where slot value exceeds the cost of maximum effort—and low-intensity encounters. The latter are governed by a mixed-strategy equilibrium defined by a truncated exponential distribution, which reflects the practical reality of carriers randomising their speed to remain competitive without exceeding economic fuel limits.

Asymmetric Contests (Two-Stage Game): To capture real-world disparities in vessel size (300 to 23,964 TEU) and starting positions, we utilize a two-stage game framework to analyze Subgame Perfect Equilibria (SPE). This accounts for the trade-off where larger vessels face more aggressive fuel penalties for speeding but possess higher slot valuations due to their substantial daily operating costs.

The framework is validated through an extensive simulation using empirical data (bunker prices at roughly 500 USD/mt and voyage lengths averaging 841 nm). The data reveals an average fuel waste of 2.591 metric tons per competitive port-call. Notably, slot valuations can reach 44,819 USD in high-demand scenarios; this provides the practical context for our parameter choices, 12 demonstrating that the financial incentive to minimize port dwell-time often justifies the severe fuel penalty incurred during the “race.”

We evaluate three interventions: mandatory speed limits, emission taxes, and financial incentives. Our findings indicate that strict speed limits (e.g., below 21 knots) can be counterproductive. Due to the cubic relationship between speed and fuel consumption, and aligning with the debate on speed reduction versus optimization, forcing a vessel significantly below its design speed can actually increase total voyage fuel consumption.

Ultimately, we advocate for a “carrot and stick” approach:

The Stick: Emission taxes to deter vessels from speeding and to mitigate the associated environmental costs of competition.

The Carrot: Financial incentives in the form of discounts on port charges for coordinated arrival management.

This approach is explicitly justified as it decouples port priority from sailing speed, removing the structural incentive for the race while maintaining operational efficiency.

مهندسی صنایع، عماد مهندسی کشور
مهندسی صنایع، عماد مهندسی کشور

مهندسی صنایعمهندس صنایع
۰
۰
مهندسی صنایع ایران
مهندسی صنایع ایران
مهندسی صنایع ایران، عماد مهندسی کشور: [email protected]
شاید از این پست‌ها خوشتان بیاید